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Rush: The Supporting Spouse's Rights in the Others Professional Degree

THE SUPPORTING SPOUSE'S RIGHTS IN THE OTHER'S
PROFESSIONAL DEGREE UPON DIVORCE
INTRODUCTION

Marriage dissolution proceedings increasingly litigate the rights of spouses
who have provided financial support while their husband or wife earned a professional degree.' This development is attributable largely to the rapidly
spreading theory of marriage as a partnership.2 Many states currently view
spouses as economic partners and treat the acquisition of marital property as a
partnership endeavor.' When marital resources are expended to acquire a professional degree, the partners make an economic investment. They anticipate
increased family income as the return on this investment. Upon divorce, the
educated spouse realizes the full benefit of the investment and the supporting
4
spouse is deprived of all or part of the expected return.

1. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1982)
(medical license); In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (master's
degree); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977) (Ph.D.); In re Marriage
of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (law degree); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d
266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (dental license); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97
(1978) (medical license); Hill v. Hill, 182 N.J. Super. 614, 442 A.2d 1072 (1982) (dental license);
Daniels v. Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (1961) (medical license).
2. Both community property and equitable distribution systems are based on partnership principles. The community property states were the first to foster the concept of marriage as a partnership. See Krauskopf, Marital Property at Marriage Dissolution, 43 Mo. L.
Ray. 157, 158 (1978); Comment, A Property Theory of Future Earning Potential in Dissolution
Proceedings, 56 WASH. L. REv. 277, 277 (1981). In community property states, all property
acquired during the marriage that is attributable to the effort and skill of either spouse is
conclusively community rather than separate property. See Greene, Comparison of the
Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common Law Marital Property Systems and
Their Relative Compatibility with the Current View of the Marriage Relationship and the
Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. Rav. 71, 73 (1979).
Equitable distribution is also based on the principle that marriage is a joint enterprise.
The system recognizes that each spouse has a right to share in the assets accumulated during
marriage. This right is not based on need, but instead reflects the concept that assets represent
the capital of what was essentially a partnership. See Gibbons v. Gibbons, 174 N.J. Super. 107,
112, 415 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 86 N.J. 515, 432 A.2d 80 (1981) (reversing court held that, due to a retroactive statutory amendment, assets acquired by gift,
bequest, or devise were not subject to equitable distribution).
3. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1982);
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979); Graham v. Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 433,
574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978) (Carrigan, J., dissenting). But see Sullivan v. Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d
634, _ 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 801 (1982) (Kaufman, J., concurring) (California presumes that
contributions made toward acquisition of the student spouse's degree are based on the mutual
affection and generosity presumed to attend the marital state). Cf. UNn'. PARTNERSHIP Acr
§ 18(a), 6 U.L.A. 213 (1969) which provides: "Each partner shall be repaid his contributions,
whether by way of capital or advances to the partnership property and share equally in the
profits and surplus remaining after all liabilities, including those to partners, are satisfied .. "
4. Cf. O'Brien v, O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d .
452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1982):
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When marital assets have been spent on one spouse's education, often there
are few tangible assets to distribute upon dissolution. Courts have used several

theories to compensate the supporting spouse. A few trial courts have examined
the professional degree as potential property. If classified as property, the degree may be valued and considered in the distribution of marital assets. Nationwide, evolving property notions have characterized similar intangibles as
property. Valuing and distributing a professional degree as property raises
further considerations. Most courts reject the property classification, but have
afforded the supporting spouse a remedy by holding that spousal contributions
to the acquisition of the degree may be considered in the divorce settlement. A
judge may compensate the supporting spouse through division of marital

property, alimony, or other equitable means. These remedies, however, have
prerdquisites that limit their utility and applicability. The supporting spouse

may also pursue restitutionary theories for the unjust enrichment of the educated spouse. Some courts have likewise invoked general equitable principles to

compensate the supporting spouse. The state courts adjudicating the question
of compensation for the supporting spouse used one of these theories. In most
states, such as Florida, the issue is unresolved or unaddressed. The choices available to these states are best analyzed by examining extant case law.
APPLYING PROPERTY CONCEPTS TO A
PROFESSIONAL DEGREE

Courts are generally reluctant to classify a professional degree as divisible
marital property. 5 Property has traditionally encompassed only tangible items
with an exchange value that can be inherited, assigned, sold, transferred, or
pledged.6 Broadly defined, however, "property" encompasses the ownership
of anything which the law will protect.7 The current trend is to acknowledge
many intangible forms of property that do not meet the traditional definition
of property A pension, for example, is personal to the holder and is not readily
marketable or inheritable. 9 Recent decisions nevertheless recognize both vested
and nonvested pension rights as property.1 0 Moreover, when earned by a
To allow a student spouse such as plaintiff in this case to leave a marriage with all
the benefits of additional education and a professional license without compensation
to the spouse who bore much of the burdens incident to procuring these would be
unfair, and in the court's opinion, contrary to the mandate of the legislature where the
marriage relationship is now viewed a[s]an "economic partnership."
5. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Marriage
of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (iowa 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
6. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).
7. See Los Animas County High School Dist, v. Raye, 144 Colo. 367, 371, 356 P.2d 237, 239
(1960) quoted in In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978).
8. See generally Comment, The Interest of the Community in a Professional Education,
10 CAL. W.L. REv. 590, 600 (1974).
9. Since the 19th century, statutory provisions have prohibited transfers, assignments, and
other conveyances of pensions. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. 343, 349 (1978).
10. See, e.g., Czarnecki v. Czarnecki, 123 Ariz. 446, 600 P.2d 1098 (1979) (military pensions
subject to community property laws); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (non-vested pension rights earned during marriage are divisible
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couple's joint efforts, pension rights are a marital asset subject to division upon

dissolution." Professional goodwill 12 and inchoate personal injury claims, 1 3
intangibles which similarly cannot be transferred on the open market, also have
been recently designated divisible marital property.' 4
Classifying a Professional Degree as Property
Focusing on these newly expanded property concepts, some trial courts
have classified a professional degree as property.' 5 Other courts have held that
a degree is not within conventional property concepts, but suggest such a
classification should be granted if equitable considerations so require.' 6 State
appellate and supreme courts uniformly have refused to classify a degree as

property.

7

under community property standards); Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 261 N.W.2d
457 (1978) (non-vested pension rights considered in dividing marital property).
11. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 845, 544 P.2d 561, 566, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 638 (1976); McGrew v. McGrew, 151 N.J. Super. 515, 518, 377 A.2d 697, 699 (1977);
Leighton v. Leighton, 81 Wis. 2d 620, 627, 261 N.W.2d 457, 463 (1978); Pinkowski v.
Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176, 179, 226 N.W.2d 518, 520 (1975). But see Ellis v. Ellis, 191 Colo. 317,
319, 552 P.2d 506, 507 (1976) (military pensions are not divisible property).
12. See, e.g., Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975); In re Marriage of Goger, 27
Or. App. 729, 557 P.2d 46 (1976); In re Marriage of Lukens, 16 Wash. App. 481, 558 P2d
279 (1976). See also Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 169-71. But see Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761,
761-64 (Tex. 1972) (refusing to value business goodwill due to speculative nature of award).
13. See, e.g., Nixon v. Nixon, 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). See also Brown,
Dissolution of Marriage- Personal Injury Damages as Marital Property, 41 Mo. L. R.Ev. 603
(1976); Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 177-78.
14. Professional goodwill, like a professional degree, is personal to the holder. It is not
readily marketable, and is not generally capable of acquisition by the mere expenditure of
money. There are several methods of valuing professional goodwill. Factors which have been
considered in making the valuation include the length of time of professional practice, age
and health of the professional, past profits, comparative success, and the condition of the
physical assets of the practice. See Comment, Divorce After Professional School: Education
and Future Earning Capacity May Be Marital Property, 44 Mo. L. RIv. 329, 334 & n.23
(1978).
To value business goodwill, find the total value of the furniture, fixtures, and accounts
receivable and subtract it from the business' total purchase price. See In re Marriage of Nichols,
606 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979). The Nichols court contended that the claim that
goodwill is a mere expectancy is without merit. The probability of continued patronage has a
present market value. The unmarketability of a professional degree distinguishes it from
business goodwill. Id.
15. See, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 38 Colo. App. 130, 555 P.2d 527 (1976), aff'd, 194 Colo.
429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (1980),
rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062, cert. granted, 91 N.J. 191, 450 A.2d 526 (1982).
There are several potential difficulties with this characterization. If a degree is classified as
property, its value might be subject to claims by creditors and tort victims. Also, parents or
others who provided funds to the student spouse could have a contract claim against the
degree's value.
16. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, -_
Misc. 2d .
452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 805 (1982).
The O'Brien court recognized that a professional degree and license are personal and cannot
be sold, assigned, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. The absence of these attributes was considered irrelevant, however, "since there is no attempt to obtain a transfer of the professional
license itself, but rather a portion of the economic fruits of its possession, having in mind
the circumstances under which it was obtained." Id.
17. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); In re Mar-
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In In Re Marriageof Graham,8 the Colorado Supreme Court examined the
property characteristics of a master's degree. 19 Mrs. Graham had supplied
seventy percent of the money required to support the couple and to pay for
her husband's education. 20 The divorce closely followed his graduation, and
no conventional assets were acquired during the marriage.21 Refusing to expand
traditional property concepts, the Graham court held that a graduate degree
is not property because it is neither inheritable nor transferable, and it lacks
a monetary exchange value. 22 The majority regarded a degree as personal to
the holder, reflecting the cumulative product of years of education and hard
work. 23 The court noted that spousal support could be considered in the
division of marital property and the calculation of alimony.2 - Mrs. Graham,
however, did not qualify for alimony and the couple had no marital assets. Because the court refused to use a property classification, Mrs. Graham was denied
25
a remedy.
A forceful dissent in Graham argued that the marital asset to be divided was
not the degree itself, but the resulting increased earning potential. 26 Future
earning capacity is frequently recognized as a compensable asset in tort actions
for wrongful death or personal injury.27 To compensate the supporting spouse
riage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1979); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla.
1979).
18. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
19. The trial court had determined that the student spouse's M.B.A. was jointly owned
property. Accordingly, the supporting spouse was awarded $33,134 to be paid in monthly installments. The court of appeals reversed. In re Marriage of Graham, 38 Colo. App. 130, 131,
555 P.2d 527, 528 (1976), aff'd, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978). The Colorado Supreme
Court thus became the first state supreme court to decide whether a professional degree
should be classified as property.
20. 194 Colo. at 431, 574 P.2d at 76. In addition, Mrs. Graham did the majority of housework and cooking for the couple. Id.
21. Id.
22. 194 Colo. at 432, 574 P.2d at 77. The court acknowledged that the Colorado Legislature intended a broad definition of the term "property" in its version of the Uniform Dissolution of Marriage Act. Nevertheless, the majority viewed property narrowly as "everything
that has an exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate." Id. (quoting
BLACK's LAiW DIcrIONARY 1382 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)). This definition would exclude many intangibles which are widely recognized as property. Indeed, the Graham court adopted the
property definition of Ellis v. Ellis, 191 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976), one of the few cases
refusing to classify pension rights as property. See supra cases cited note 11. See also Comment,
Graduate Degree Rejected as Marital Property Subject to Division Upon Divorce: In re
Marriage of Graham, 11 CONN. L. Ray. 62 (1978).
23. 574 P.2d at 77. The court further explained that a degree is "simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition of property." Id. Colorado
is an equitable distribution state by statute. See COLO. Rxv. Str. § 14-10-113 (1973). Consequently, if the degree had been labeled property, Mrs. Graham would likely have been
entitled to 70% of its value. See infra 73-76 and accompanying text.
24. 574 P.2d at 78. For other cases denying property classification in favor of compensating spousal support in the divorce settlement, see infra note 98.
25. Mrs. Graham was self-supporting and therefore ineligible for statutory maintenance.
194 Colo. at 435, 574 P.2d at 78-79 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
26. 574 P.2d at 78.
27. See, e.g., Handelman v. Victor Equip. Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 902, 99 Cal. Rptr. 90
(1972); Ortega v. Perrini & Sons, Inc., 371 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979).
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when there are no marital assets, the dissenting justice contended that future
28
earnings should be a distributable marital asset in dissolution proceedings.
The distinction between a degree and increased earning potential was subsequently employed by the Iowa Supreme Court in In Re Marriage of Horstmann.2 9 While refusing to classify a professional degree as property,30 the
Horstmann court held that the increased earning capacity made possible by
1
spousal contributions is capable of division upon divorce.3 The Horstmann
majority opinion and the Graham dissent evidence judicial willingness to
compensate the supporting spouse when presented with an acceptable means.
If the degree has made acquisition of conventionally distributable assets
32
possible, it is even less likely that the degree will be classified as property. In
3 3

Leveck v. Leveck,

a Kentucky appellate court held that a degree was not

property when other marital assets were available for distribution. 34 Although
35
the Leveck court
characterized a degree as property,
36
The Levecks' divorce did not
limited that holding to an assetless divorce.
closely follow award of the degree, and their marital assets were a direct result

an earlier decision

28. 574 P.2d at 79. The dissent argued that equitable considerations should have been
explored more closely. Suggesting several alternative theories, the dissent listed implied debt,
quasi-contract, and unjust enrichment. Id.
29. 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978). The Horstmanns were married while both were attending college. The wife contributed $15,760.00 to the family's support. Her parents contributed $10,514.00, bought the wife a car, and supplied all the family's meat. The couple
separated in July, 1975, and the supporting spouse filed for divorce in March, 1976. The
law degree was awarded in May, 1976. Id. at 886.
30. Id. at 893. Adopting Graham's view of a professional degree, the court explained
that a degree is personal, terminates on death of the holder, and is not inheritable. Additionally, it cannot be sold, transferred, or conveyed. The degree is simply an intellectual
achievement which may aid the holder in the future accumulation of property. Id.
31. Id. at 891. The court did not explain or justify this distinction, but simply proceeded
to a valuation of the asset. For a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of characterizing future earning potential as a divisible marital asset, see Comment, supra note 2, at 284-87.
- 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 806 (1982) (O'Brien
32. Cf. O'Brien v. O'Brien, -__ Misc. 2d ..
court suggested that its classification of the degree as property would be limited to assefless
divorces).
33. 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
34. Id. at 712.
35. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ct. App. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. 1982). The Kentucky Court of Appeals had originally ruled
that the dentistry license involved was divisible property, and remanded the case for valuation
of the license based on potential increased earning capacity. 9 FAM. L. RIP. (BNA) at 2131. On
the second appeal, the court instead decided that the supporting spouse should receive only
the value of her contributions plus interest. Id. The Kentucky Supreme Court reversed this
second determination, based upon the law of the case doctrine, which binds a court to its
initial decision if the issues on appeal remain unchanged. Id. at 2132. In dicta, the court
rejected the classification of a professional degree as property, but recommended a remedy
for the supporting spouse in an assetless divorce based upon both contributions made by the
spouse and the potential for increased earning capacity made possible by the degree. Id. at
2133.
36. The Leveck court explained that Inman's classification of the degree as property
was the only way to achieve an equitable result. Because there was no marital property other
than the degree, the supporting spouse was not eligible for maintenance. Thus, the
Inman court could extend a remedy only by characterizing the degree as property. 614
S.W.2d at 712.
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of the student spouse's education." The court therefore considered a share of

the combined assets adequate compensation for the supporting spouse's investment in the professional degree.38
Although the Leveck court may have achieved an equitable result through
property division, this remedy is only meaningful when the parties have
accumulated assets other than the degree before divorce.3 9 If divorce closely
follows award of the degree, the couple will not have reaped the benefits of
their investment.- Few partners in a student marriage can simultaneously acquire both a degree and conventionally distributable assets. 41 If there are no
conventional assets, classifying the degree as property recognizes an asset that
42
may be divided.
Valuation Methods
A court classifying a professional degree or the resulting future earning
potential as a divisible marital asset then faces the difficult problem of valuation. Indeed, perceived difficulties may account for judicial reluctance to
label a professional degree as property. 43 Various valuation methods have
nonetheless been advocated and applied. 44 Each method, as with all remedies,
reflects the substantive grounds upon which relief is granted.
37. Mrs. Leveck worked for three and one-half years, supporting her husband and paying
his tuition. She then stopped working outside the home. For the next seven and one-half
years the spouses lived on Mr. Leveck's income and acquired a small marital estate. Id.
38. Cf. id. ("In this case, an equitable result was [reached] without treatment of the
[degree] as marital property.').
39. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. at 433, 574 P.2d at 78 (1978). Although
Graham suggested that spousal support may be compensated in a property settlement, the
court effectively denied the plaintiff a remedy because no marital assets were available for
distribution.
40. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979). The total commitment
of marital funds towards the student spouse's education left the parties with few conventional
assets. No home, furnishings, savings, or investments were available for distribution upon
divorce because the marital resources had been dissipated on the education. Id. at 751.
41. Comment, supra note 22, at 70.
42. The student spouse, although without means at divorce, can be obliged to pay the
property distribution in future installments. In an equitable distribution state, the supporting
spouse could be awarded greater than 50% of the degree's value. In a community property
state this may not be available. Cf. Schofield v. Gold, 26 Ariz. 296, 225 P. 71, 73-74 (1924)
(under community property system, equality of interest may not be disturbed).
43. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134-35 (1969);
In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 432, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (1978). Cf. Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 606, 442 A.2d 1062, 1068, cert. granted, 91 N.J. 191, 450 A.2d
526 (1982). In Mahoney, the court explained that a degree's value can be expressed only as
the anticipated enhanced income attributable to the degree. Thus, when a degree is classified as
property, the actual asset to be divided is the increased future earning capacity. Id.
44. The dissent in Sullivan noted that there are various methods available to calculate the
increased value of a professional degree. The first is to ascertain the actual expenditure of
community funds and community skills to arrive at the amount of the community interest in
, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 815. This method apthe professional degree. -_ Cal. App. 3d at
pears to be a form of restitution; however, calculating the value of the community hours
spent pursuing the degree would be difficult. Further, once the community interest was
determined, the court would presumably split that amount equally between the community
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A professional degree may be valued at its cost alone, without reference to
future increased earning potential. Such an award is restitutionary in nature
and merely reimburses the spouse for contributions made throughout the
marriage. 45 Alternatively, an award could be based on future earnings,
recognizing the supporting spouse's lost expectations and preventing a windfall to the educated spouse.46 The expectation award would seem appropriate
if the court based its decision on partnership contractual theories. A similar
approach would place a "buyer's" value on a professional degree.4 7 This method
of valuation requires initially determining the actual purchase price of the
degree, based upon the amount spent for books, tuition, and other expenses.
The student spouse's contribution of personal efforts and skills are assessed by
calculating the student's lost earning potential while in school. 48 These sums
49
are added together to determine the total cost value of the degree.
Alternatively, the value of the degree could include the cost of the degree
and the resulting increase in earning potential. In O'Brien v. O'Brien,50 the
court classified a medical education and license as divisible marital property, 51
and relied upon expert testimony to calculate its value.5 2 The expert evaluated
the medical education separately from the medical license. 5 3 The education's
value was assessed by computing the supporting spouse's total financial
contributions over the nine-year marriage.54 The medical license was valued
partners. While this would be a form of restitution, the supporting spouse might not receive
a dollar award equal to his actual outlay of cash. Another valuation method is determination
of the amount of community money lost by the student spouse's attendance at school instead of being employed full time at a job for which he was qualified prior to receiving the
degree. Id. Since the amount of money lost was community money, the loss would be split
equally between the community partners. The supporting spouse would receive an award
equal to one-half of the amount the court determined the student spouse could have earned
for the community. A third calculation method is comparison of the income of the holder
shortly after award of the professional degree with his income immediately before acquisition
of the degree. Id. This method obviously assumes that there are two such incomes to compare.
45. This was the remedy granted by the Horstmann court. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
46. See Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266, 268-69 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 9 FAMf. L. RE'. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. 1982).

47. See Comment, supra note 8, at 603-04.
48. This sum is sometimes referred to as the "opportunity cost" of an education. See
Shultz, Capital Formation by Education, 68 J. POL. ECON. 571 (1960).

49. Of course, this method fails to take into account the prospective worth of a degree
as a final product. Some ommentators have therefore suggested that a cost evaluation may not
be a true evaluation. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 8, at 604.
50.

114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982).

51. Id. at
, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806. Although the O'Brien court utilized a unique
analysis in evaluating separately the education and license, the opinion often uses the term
"degree" as a synonym for either. Compare id. at _, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805 ("medical school
degree and license to practice medicine . . . are marital property ..
") with id. at - 452
N.Y.S.2d at 806 ("education and degree constituted property right ... ").
52. Id. at _, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805. Because the graduate failed to produce any expert
testimony as to this "crucial issue," the court accepted that of the supporting spouse.
53. Id.
54. Id. The expert valued the education at $103,390 by adding together the supporting
spouse's earnings and the contributions of the supporting spouse's parents, and reducing this
sum to present value.
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by approximating the physician's expected future earnings.5 5 This decision
illustrates one valuation method upon a finding that a professional degree is
property; however, the O'Brien court granted only the future earnings award. 58
A court finding that only the future earning potential, rather than the
degree itself, is a divisible marital asset would logically be limited to awarding
a portion of these earnings. In Horstmann, however, the court found that the
increased earning capacity of the educated spouse is an asset subject to division
upon divorce, but granted a restitutionary remedy.57 Horstmann's inconsistency of theory and method may be attributable to fears that valuing future
earning capacity would be too speculative.5 8 A degree does not guarantee that
it will in fact yield future earnings. The graduate may enter a career that does
not utilize the degree, become unemployed, or die.5 9 Even assuming the degree
is actually used for an average lifetime, the future earnings award is conjectural and complex. Taxes and inflation must be assessed, and the award
should reflect the degree's decreasing value as the value of professional experience and goodwill increases.60
The speculative nature of an award based on future earning capacity is
an invalid reason for refusing to classify either the degree or future earnings
as divisible marital assets. Many recognized forms of intangible property are
equally difficult to accurately evaluate and distribute. Certainly nonvested
55. Id. at -, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 805-06. The expert determined that the present value
of the medical license was $472,000.
56. Id. at _, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 806. The court stated that "under the circumstances of
this case," both the education and the degree are property rights subject to division between
the spouses. Id. However, the supporting spouse's award did not include the value of the
education but reflected solely a portion of the present value of the license.
Because New York is an equitable distribution state, N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 236B (McKinney 1981), the court divided the license on a percentage contribution basis. The court
concluded that the supporting spouse was entitled to 40% of the asset's value, and awarded
her $188,800 to be paid over ten years in amounts that increased commensurate with the
452 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
professional spouse's anticipated future earnings. 114 Misc. 2d _,
57. 263 N.W.2d at 891. The court affirmed a property award of $18,000 for the supporting
spouse. In arriving at this figure, the court totalled the funds contributed by the supporting
spouse, tie funds received from her parents, and the value of the goods contributed to the
family. From that total, the sum of all funds contributed by the student spouse was subtracted. The remainder was awarded to the supporting spouse. Monies received from the
student spouse's parents and from a loan were not deducted because those funds went
directly toward educational expenses and were not used for the family's support. The award
was payable annually with interest, and the principal was scheduled to increase after the
first two years. Id. at 886-88. This type of payment schedule makes it easier for the student
spouse to pay the obligation and provides an annual income for the supporting spouse. As in
Horstmann, the payments were to increase after the first few years to reflect both an increase in the cost of living and the expected increase in the professional's income. See, e.g.,
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, _ 452 N.Y.S2d 801, 806 (1982) (anticipating increase
in student spouse's earning capacity, payments steadily increased).
58. See Comment, supra note 14, at 332.
59. See generally DeWitt v. DeWitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980). In DeWitt,
the court rejected a future earning capacity valuation of a professional degree. The court
explained that a prediction of the degree holder's professional success might bear no relationship to the subsequent reality: the professional might fail, change careers, or undergo unanticipated changes in financial opportunity. Id. at 58, 296 N.W.2d at 768.
60. See Comment, supra note 14, at 334.
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pension rights, like a degree, do not guarantee future income. 61 Although
their value is realizable only in the future, pension rights, professional goodwill,62 and personal injury claims-3 have all been divided upon divorce.64

Courts faced with the problem of valuing future earning capacity in a
divorce settlement could adopt the methods currently used in tort law. Future
earnings awards are often granted in personal injury and wrongful death
actions. 5 Such an award approximates the present value of the income foregone, incorporating expert analyses of such variables as inflation, interest rates,
unemployment, promotional probabilities, and average life spans. 6 A divorce
court could similarly consider these variables in comparing the student's life7
time earning capacities before and after acquisition of the degree.
Dividing a Professional Degree
Once a court values the degree or future earning capacity, it must divide
the asset between the parties in accordance with the particular jurisdiction's
property system. In the United States, the two basic systems of marital property
are common law separate property and community property.68 The common
law separate property system provides that each spouse owns any property individually acquired before or during the marriage. 69 The spouse in whose
61. For authority that nonvested pension rights can nevertheless be valued and divided
upon divorce, see supra cases cited at note 11.
62. Goodwill has been defined as "the expectation of continued public patronage." In re
Marriage of Foster, 42 Cal. App. 3d 577, 582, 117 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52 (1974). The Foster court
explained that "a proper means of arriving at the value of such goodwill contemplates any
legitimate method of evaluation that measures its present value by taking into account some
past result." Id. at 584, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 54. See Comment, supra note 2, at 280-82. Factors
which have been considered in valuing professional goodwill include the length of professional practice, the professional's age and health, past profits, comparative success, and
the condition of the practice's physical assets. See Comment, supra note 14, at 334 & n.23. Another method of valuing goodwill is to ascertain the total value of the furniture, fixtures, and
accounts receivable and subtract that amount from the purchase price of the business. See
Nichols v. Nichols, 43 Colo. App. 383, 606 P.2d 1314, 1315 (1979).
63. In Nixon v. Nixon, 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975), the Missouri court classified
the proceeds of a personal injury claim as divisible marital property. The difficulty of valuing
a cause of action can be circumvented by postponing the division until the proceeds are
actually collected. See Krauskopf, supra note 2, at 177-78.
64. See supra note 13.
65. See Handelman v. Victor Equip. Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 902, 99 Cal. Rptr. 90 (1972);
Ortega v. Perrini & Sons, Inc., 371 So. 2d 203 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1979).
66. See, e.g., King, Divorce Settlements: The Value of Human Capital, 18 TRIAL 48, 50
(1982).
67. The trial court in In re Marriage of Graham, 38 Colo. App. 130, 555 P.2d 527 (1976),
valued an advanced degree based upon projections of expected earnings over the holder's
working life both with and without the degree. Id. at _,
555 P.2d at 528. See also Comment,
supra note 22, at 65.
68. Comment, supra note 22, at 64 n.3. See generally Bartke & Zurvalec, The Low, Middle
and High Roads to Marital Property Law Reform in Common Law Jurisdictions,7 CoiMUNrry
PROP. J. 200 (1980) (description of the common law, community property, and equitable distribution property systems); Greene, supra note 2.
69. See Comment, supra note 22, at 63 n.3. At early common law, the wife's legal identity
merged with that of the husband. The husband became owner of his wife's chattels, and was
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name the property is titled generally retains complete ownership upon
divorce. 70 Because a degree or education is effectively "titled" in the student's
name, a common law separate property state would likely find it the personal
property of the student. 71
72
Recognizing that marriage is a joint enterprise similar to a partnership,
all but four common law separate property states have adopted the equitable
distribution system. 73 Title is irrelevant, 74 as all property acquired during
marriage is designated marital property and divided according to the percentage
contributed by each spouse toward its acquisition. 75 Thus, if a degree is considered marital property in an equitable distribution state, each spouse would
receive a percentage of its value proportionate to his or her investment. 71
The community property system fundamentally presumes both husband and
wife contribute equally to the marriage community, regardless of the quality
or quantity of contribution. Each spouse owns a present, vested, undivided
one-half interest in community property. 77 Separate property is not divisible
given valuable rights in her land. In return, the wife was given three rights, primarily in the
form of duties placed on her husband: (1) the husband had a duty to support his wife; (2) he
was liable for all debts or other wrongs committed by his wife during their marriage; and (3)
the wife was entitled to dower. On the whole, these rights were much less valuable than those
conferred upon the husband. See Greene, supra note 2, at 72.
70. All property titled solely in one spouse's name, regardless of when or how acquired, is
separate property and not subject to division. A separate property system provides theoretical
equality, as each spouse is the owner of all property which he or she earns or acquires during
marriage. This equality has been illusory. Until recently, most of the property acquired during
marriage was titled solely in the husband's name. This is especially so when the wife is a
homemaker and does not seek employment outside the home. Upon divorce, therefore, a
marital property system which excludes all separately titled property from distribution is
promoting unequal treatment under the guise of equality. See Comment, supra note 22, at 63
n.3. The equity courts recognized the fundamental unfairness of this practice and began to
award alimony payments to the wife. See, e.g., 1828 FLA. LAWS §§ 7, 12 (as modified, FIA.
STAT. § 61.08 (1981)). Florida did not recognize a husband's right to alimony until FLA. STAT.
§ 61.08(1) (1971) was enacted.
71. Those states still considered to be common law separate property jurisdictions are
South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia. None of these jurisdictions has been
asked to classify a degree as property.
72. See supra note 2.

73. Thirty-nine

states allow equitable distribution upon divorce. See Comment,

Domestic Relations: Military Retirement Pay and Equitable Division in Divorce Courts-

Pre-Emption, 34 U. FLA. L. R1y. 280, 286 n.53 (1982). Some states, such as New York, have
statutes specificially directing equitable distribution of marital property upon divorce. See
N.Y. DOM. R.L. LAw § 236 (McKinney 1981). Other states, including Florida, have judicially
adopted the system. See, e.g., Canakaris v. Canakaris, 383 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980).
74. See Foster, Commentary on Equitable Distribution,26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1, 8 (1981).
75. See Bartke & Zurvalec, supra note 68, at 219-20. See also Gibbons v. Gibbons, 174 N.J.
Super. 107, 112, 415 A.2d 1174, 1177 (1980), rev'd on other grounds, 86 N.J. 515, 432 A.2d 80
(1981). In contrast to a community property state, an equitable distribution state could
award the supporting spouse an amount in excess of or less than one half of the degree's
value. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
76. Because property division in an equitable distribution state reflects each party's
contribution to the marriage, a homemaker may receive a share of property acquired during
marriage but titled in the sole name of the salaried spouse. See Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d
719, 726 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974).
77. See Greene, supra note 2, at-73.
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between the partners and includes property owned by one prior to marriage or
acquired thereafter by gift, devise, or descent.1 8 Community property is all
other property acquired by either spouse during marriage2 9 Some community
property states additionally provide that any increase in value of separate
property during the marriage is divisible between the spouses at dissolution. 0
Both community property and equitable distribution systems are based on
partnership principles,"' therefore, their methods of property allocation in
marriage dissolution proceedings are similar.82 The major difference is that
marital property is divided equally in community property states8 3 and on a
8 4
percentage contribution basis in equitable distribution states.
A degree acquired during marriage could be designated community
property consistently with community property principles. When community
funds are expended for property, the acquired possession is generally considered community property. 5 Additionally, any fruits from the labor, efforts,
and skills of either spouse will be community assets.8s A degree acquired with
community assets should be deemed community property and divided equally
between the spouses upon divorce.87
Even if a professional degree is viewed as the separate property of the
student, the supporting spouse may be entitled to compensation.88 When com78. See id. at 72. The doctrine that the separate property of one spouse is not divisible
upon divorce is not universally accepted. See, e.g., Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d
484 (1974). In Painter, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that separate property owned
prior to marriage remains separate property and is not divisible. However, separate property
acquired during the marriage, regardless if it is by gift, devise, bequest, or descent, becomes
marital property subject to equitable distribution upon divorce. Further, the burden of establishing immunity from division is on the spouse who asserts it. Id. at 214, 320 A.2d at 49394. See also Browning v. Browning, 46 Wash. 2d 538, 283 P.2d 125 (1955). In Browning, the
Washington Supreme Court indicated that where the separate property was acquired in
whole or in part by joint efforts, it may be divided upon divorce. Id. at 542, 283 P.2d at 128.
But see Bixby v. Bixby, 120 Cal. App. 2d 495, 498, 261 P.2d 286, 287 (1953) (court does not
have authority to compel divestment of the separate property of either spouse nor require
payment of any sum in lieu of an assignment or division of the separate property).
79.

See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN,

PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY

PROPERTY

§§ 1-10

(2d

ed. 1971).
80. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct.
App. 1982). If the ability, activity, or capacity of either spouse contributes to an increase in
value of separate property, that increase is considered to be property of the community. Id.
at _,
184 Cal. Rptr. at 813. See also Claflin & Co. v. Pfeifer, 76 Tex. 469, 13 S.W. 483
(1890). In other states, the income from separate property remains separate property. See, e.g.,
NEv. REV. STAT. § 123.130 (1973).
81. See supra note 2.
82. See generally Bartke, Yours, Mine & Ours -Separate Title and Community Funds, 44
WASH. L. Rav. 379 (1969).
83. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 76 Nev. 318, 353 P.2d 449 (1960). But cf. Ridgway v.
Ridgway, 94 N.M. 345, 610 P.2d 749 (1980) (no requirement that each spouse receive exactly
same dollar value).
84. See, e.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982).
85. See Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Nev. 301, 306, 486 P.2d 359, 364 (1970) (quoting Ormachea v.
Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, 297, 217 P.2d 355, 367 (1950)).
86. Id.
87. See Comment, supra note 8, at 602.
88. If a professional degree is classified as the separate property of the holder, equity
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munity funds and services are dispensed to enhance separate property, the
community is entitled to reimbursement for the appropriation. 9 Similarly,
any increase in the value of separate property during marriage is divisible upon
divorce when the increase is attributable to the ability, activity, or capacity of
either spouse.90 In In re Marriage of Sullivan,91 a California appellate court
recognized these principles and ordered the community to be reimbursed for
community funds spent to acquire the degree.92 The California court reversed
itself on rehearing and repudiated any use of property principles. 93 The degree
principles appropriately could invoke a constructive trust. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18
Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 126, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1976). Cf. In re Marriage of
Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 435, 574 P.2d at 79 (1977) (Carrigan, J., dissenting) (spouse might be
entitled to an independent action in equity since she had an interest in husband's earning
capacity). When basic fairness requires that one other than the legal owner have an interest in
an item of property, a constructive trust is appropriate. See Davis v. Howard, 19 Or. App. 310,
313, 527 P.2d 422, 424 (1974). The student spouse could hold legal title to the property for
the benefit of the supporting spouse in a percentage equal to the supporting spouse's interest.
The percentage share would vary depending on the jurisdiction's property system. In a
community state, the student spouse would hold in trust an amount equal to one-half of the
value of the degree. In an equitable distribution jurisdiction, the student spouse would hold
in trust an amount equal to the percentage contribution made by the supporting spouse to
acquisition of the degree. Under either property system, the dollar sum would depend on the
method employed to calculate the degree's value.
89. The improvements remain a part of the separate estate, but the community is
entitled to reimbursement for the use of its funds. See Provost v. Provost, 102 Col. App. 775,
283 P. 842, 843 (1929). The reimbursement award may, however, be precluded by the supporting spouse's consent to the appropriation. Id.
184 Cal. Rptr. 796,
90. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d 634, ._
813 (1982); Strohm v. Strohm, 182 Cal. App. 2d 53, 62, 5 Cal. Rptr. 884, 889 (1960).
Colorado is a community property state that has statutorily mandated equitable distribution. The court is directed to justly divide all marital property considering each spouse's
contribution to the acquisition of marital property and any enhancement of separate property
due to community resources. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113(1)(a) & (d) (1973). The statute
further provides that "marital" property includes separate property "to the extent that its
present value exceeds its value at the time of the marriage or at the time of the acquisition if
acquired after the marriage." Id. § 14-10-113(4).
This statute was in effect at the time the Graham case was decided. See supra notes 18-28
and accompanying text. The Graham court held that a professional degree is not property.
The court's own language describing the attributes of a professional degree could support
an argument that the degree is the personal separate property of the student spouse. See
574 P.2d at 77. The above statute makes it clear that an increase in the value of separate
property during the marriage is divisible upon divorce. Therefore, it appears that a supporting spouse may not be totally without remedy in an assetless situation.
91. 50 U.S.L.W. 2457 (Cal. Ct. App.), rev'd on rehearing,134 Cal. App. 3d 634, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1982).
92. 50 U.S.L.W. at 2458. When Sullivan was originally decided, it appeared to evidence
a relaxation of the rigid rule of Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (Ct.
App. 1969) (even if education is property, it cannot by nature be divided upon divorce).
93. 50 U.S.L.W. at 2457-58. The court held that a degree could not be property because
it was not susceptible of ownership in common, of transfer, or of existence beyond the death
of the holder. 134 Cal. App. 3d at __ 184 Cal. Rptr. at 800. The court relied upon a definition of property from Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 725, 155 P.2d 637, 641
(1945). In Franklin, the California Supreme Court decided that the right to practice a licenseregulated profession was not community property. As the dissent in Sullivan pointed out,
however, Franklin was decided prior to the enactment of CAL. Civ. CODE § 4800 (West 1981).
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was held not property; therefore, the community reimbursement issue was
moot.9 4 As Sullivan demonstrates, although a property classification may be the
most facile, judicial reluctance to extend property concepts undermines its
utility.
CONSIDERING SPOUSAL SUPPORT IN THE
DIVORCE SETTLEMENT

When a degree is denied property classification, the supporting spouse may
nevertheless be compensated through the distribution of other marital assets
or by an alimony award. 5 A dissolution court has broad discretion to achieve
a just and equitable result. 9'; In balancing the equities of a divorce settlement,
the judge may consider the earning capacities of both spouses, and the contributions of one toward enhancing the other's earning potential.97 Many courts
rely on equitable principles to compensate the supporting spouse's financial
contributions and lost expectations by the division of conventional assets or
alimony awards.98
Alimony Awards
Courts rejecting a property classification of the professional degree may
134 Cal. App. 3d at -. , 184 Cal. Rptr. at 804. Prior to CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800, which directs
an equal division of community property, the courts could consider contributions of one
spouse to the other's education in awarding shares of property. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272
184
Call. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969). See also Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d _,
Cal. Rptr. at 805.
94. Cf. 50 U.S.L.W. at 2458. "This court also holds that where there has been an ascertainable increase in the value of an education . . . then the community also possesses a
pro tanto interest in such increase in value during the marriage." Id.
95. See, e.g., Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky Ct. App. 1981).
96. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1981) (court may consider any factor necessary to do
equity and justice between spouses); Wis. STAT. §§ 247.255 & .26 (1977) (in dividing property
or awarding alimony payments, courts are to consider factors in each case which it deems
relevant to a just disposition). The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted that state's
divorce courts' equity powers as unlimited, except where specifically regulated by statute.
See DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758 (Minn. 1981) (divorce courts have inherent power to grant equitable relief).
97. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 796, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 137 (1969). The
Third District Court of Appeal held that even if an education could be deemed community
property, its nature was such that a monetary value for purposes of division could not be
placed upon it. The court concluded that the traditional marital assets were the result of
the professional degree. The supporting spouse was held to have received value for her investment by a mere division of the assets acquired by the degree holding spouse. Because the
court perceived no remedy for the supporting spouse in an education-is-property holding, it
did not fully consider the issue. In Todd, the conventional assets available for distribution
had been acquired as a direct result of the student spouse's legal education. The court
reasoned that in a sense the supporting spouse had already realized most of the value of her
investment because the degree had made acquisition of the traditional assets possible. Id.
98. See, e.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 343-45, 631 P.2d 115, 122-23 (Ct. App. 1981);
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 609-12, 442 A.2d 1062, 1069-70 (1982); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 7, 318 N.W.2d 918, 922 (19882). The Wisner court stated that
spousal contributions should also be considered in an award of child support, if applicable.
129 Ariz. at 343, 631 P.2d at 122.
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compensate the supporting spouse through an alimony award. 99 By recognizing
one spouse's contributions to the other's acquisition of a degree, a substantial
alimony award could equalize the spouses' economic positions. Alimony, however, is usually predicated upon the recipient's need and the obligor's ability
to pay. 0' Having demonstrated the ability to be self-supporting, the supporting spouse will frequently be ineligible for alimony.101 Alimony awards may
also be modified and generally terminate with remarriage or death. 0 2 Consequently, conventional alimony may provide insufficient compensation for the
spouse's contributions and lost expectations upon dissolution.
Lump sum alimony addresses many of the shortcomings of conventional
alimony in recompensing the supporting spouse. A lump sum award may not
require proof of need by the supporting spouse, 0 3 and can be used freely to
achieve equity and justice between the parties. 04 Upon entry of a final divorce
decree, lump sum alimony becomes a vested right which cannot be modified
nor terminated upon remarriage or death. 0 5 It may be a monetary award payable in installments or comprised of real or personal property. 0 6 Lump sum
alimony is a viable remedy in an assetless divorce. The professional spouse can
meet this obligation through future earnings and the supporting spouse's ex07
pectations are recompensed.
Equitable Awards in the Divorce Proceeding
When divorce closely follows award of a professional degree, there may be
little, if any, traditional property before the court. The lack of readily divisible
assets and the unavailability of alimony, however, do not necessarily foreclose
an award to the supporting spouse. Recently, two state supreme courts extended
a remedy to the supporting spouse in an assetless divorce based solely on per-:
ceptions of equity and natural justice. 08
99. Cf. Otis v. Otis, 299 N.W.2d 114, 117 (1980) (alimony predicated on lack of sufficient
marital property to support spouse seeking maintenance).
100. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 14-10-114(1)(a) (b) (1973) (denies alimony unless one spouse
lacks sufficient property to provide for his needs and is unable to support himself); MINN. STAT.
§ 518.552 (1980) (denies maintenance unless one spouse lacks sufficient property to meet his
reasonable needs and is unable to adequately support himself, or is custodian of a child under
circumstances which make it appropriate that he not seek employment outside the home). But
see Collinsworth v. Collinsworth, 386 So. 2d 570, 571 (Fla. 1st D.CA. 1980) (court rejected
implication that lump sum alimony could not be awarded absent proof of need and ability to

pay). For a discussion of lump sum alimony and its exemption from the historical prerequisites
of maintenance, see infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
101. See, e.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 366 So. 2d 1210, 1211-12 (1st D.C.A. 1978),
rev'd on other grounds,403 So. 2d 1306 (Fla. 1981); Cann v. Cann, 334 So. 2d 325, 330 (Fla. Ist
D.CA. 1976); In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41, 49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
102. See, e.g., Little v. Little, 349 So. 2d 48 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).
103. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1201 (Fla. 1980).
104. See Yandell v. Yandell, 39 So. 2d 554, 556-57 (Fla. 1949).
105. See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 49 II. App. 3d 1011, 1014, 365 N.E.2d 182, 184 (1977).
106. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Babb, 30 Or. App. 581, 567 P.2d 599 (1977).
107. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
108. DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107
Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.V.2d 918 (1982).
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In DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa,109 the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to
classify an education short of an advanced degree as property for purposes of
division upon divorce. 110 The court determined, however, that principles of
equity weighed heavily in favor of extending a remedy to the supporting
spouse."" Concluding that divorce courts have inherent equitable power to
provide such relief, the court upheld a monetary award to the supporting
spouse.112 Subsequently, in Lundberg v. Lundberg,1 13 the Wisconsin Supreme

Court determined that a judge's goal in divorce cases is to achieve a fair and
equitable result."1 In sanctioning an award for the supporting spouse
through either a property settlement or maintenance award, the Lundberg
court recognized the supporting spouse should be recompensed even when
such an award exceeds the divisible marital assets." 5

109. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981). The supporting spouse had completed her undergraduate education prior to marriage. The husband was just beginning his at the time of
marriage. The wife supported the couple from July, 1972 to November, 1977. When they
separated, the husband was in his second year of medical school. Id. at 756.
110. Id. at 758-59. The supporting spouse urged the court to hold that an education is
divisible marital property. Noting that all cases deciding this issue had dealt with an advanced degree, the court declined to consider the property question. Id. (Distinguishing
between whether the advanced degree is finally earned or only substantially begun is
arbitrary.) If courts refuse to extend a remedy solely because the advanced degree has not
yet been acquired, the result would be to adopt a policy of encouraging divorce. The student
spouse who ends his marriage at the first sign of marital difficulty, and prior to earning the
degree would be financially rewarded for his lack of perseverance.
111. Id. at 758.
112. Id. at 758-59. The award granted in DeLa Rosa was limited to the value of contributions made toward the student spouse's living and educational expenses. The court thus
subtracted the supporting spouse's living expenses from her own earnings to arrive at a total
of $11,400. Id. at 759. The case was remanded to the trial court with instructions to utilize a
periodic payment plan or a lump sum award. Id. at 759 & n.11.
113. 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982). In Lundberg, both parties were attending
college at the time of their marriage. The wife was in graduate school, and she completed
her studies with a Master's Degree in English. The husband received a Master's Degree in
Biology and entered medical school. The wife supported them both throughout her
husband's medical education. The husband was finishing his second year of a three-year
residency program when the wife filed for divorce. Id. at 3-4, 318 N.W.2d at 919-20.
114. Id. at _,
318 N.W.2d at 924. The court examined the legislative history behind
the state's property division and maintenance payment statutes, and concluded that the
legislature intended to compensate a spouse upon divorce when that spouse had been socially
and economically handicapped by his contributions to the marital relationship. Id. at
318 N.W.2d at 922.
115. Id. The court emphasized that Wisconsin's Divorce Reform Act, Wis. STAT. § 247.26
(1977), authorized maintenance payments with the intent that the statute be used as a flexible
tool to ensure a fair and equitable determination between the spouses. The court noted that
in Wisconsin, maintenance is no longer limited to situations where a spouse lacks sufficient
property or ability to be self-supporting. 107 Wis. 2d
, 318 N.W.2d at 923. Although the
Lundberg court awarded the supporting spouse the amount requested, a full restitutionary
award would have exceeded that figure, and the court indicated that it would have approved a
greater award if requested. The supporting spouse computed the award as follows: Monies
contributed to support of the student spouse plus a five percent rate of return on her investment. The total came to S33,077, however, the spouse requested only $25,000. Id. at
318 N.W.2d at 920.
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The equity-based remedy has much to recommend it.116 It is relatively
simple to discern whether a remedy should be extended. The process requires a
balancing of various factors already before the divorce court. 17 Perhaps the
best feature of this remedy is that it is familiar to the court and avoids the
difficult and novel property issue. Its weakness is the premise of inequity which
is subject to quixotic judicial perceptions that may limit its use to an otherwise
assetless dissolution."L8
The supporting spouse's recovery depends upon judicial perception of in20
equity" 9 that will invoke the inherent equitable powers of a divorce court.'
In Mahoney v. Mahoney,'2 ' a New Jersey court discounted the inequities in an
assetless divorce and consequently denied compensation to the supporting
spouse. 22 The court reasoned that spouses define their marital responsibilities
116. One potential criticism of the equity based remedy is that it allows a great deal of
discretion to the divorce judge. A reasonableness test should be a sufficient check on the
judge's authority. If reasonable persons could differ as to the result reached by the trial
court, the result is not unreasonable and not an abuse of discretion. This test thus recognizes
the superior vantage point of the trial judge. For a description of and justification for the
reasonableness test, see Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197, 1203 (Fla. 1980).
117. The information offered to prove the supporting spouse's entitlement to relief would
ordinarily be present where alimony, child support, and/or property settlement were involved.
The divorce judge's familiarity with and expertise in weighing these factors would reduce
any additional burden placed on the courts.
184 Cal. Rptr. 796,
118. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sullivan, 134 Cal. App. 3d at 634, 825 (1982) (Ziebarth, J., dissenting). Judge Ziebarth noted that CAL. Cry. CODE § 4351 (West
1981) provides divorce courts with jurisdiction to determine the status of the marriage, custody
and support of children, support of either spouse, settlement of property rights, and award
of attorney's fees and costs. Thus, the statute prohibited the exercise of general equity powers
by the state's divorce courts. Id. at _.._, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 824. The Sullivan dissent therefore
advocated an independent action based on equity principles which could be consolidated with
184 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
the divorce action for trial purposes. Id. at119. See, e.g., Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 344, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981). The
Wisner court rejected an unjust enrichment argument from a supporting spouse in an assetless
divorce. In the absence of an agreement between the parties, the court considered such legal
arguments improper because they do not fit the context of the marital relationship. The court
explained that when the spouses marry, they decide on a division of labor between themselves. The value of that labor is then consumed by the community, and it affords no basis
to support a claim of unjust enrichment upon divorce. Id. See also In re Marriage of Sullivan,
184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 801-02 (Kaufman, J., concurring). Justice
134 Cal. App. 3d 634, _,
Kaufman did not perceive any inequity in denying relief to the supporting spouse because:
(1) California law prevents the courts from looking at the fault of either party, and considerations of fault would be essential to determine whether inequity existed; and (2) the supporting spouse does not expect compensation when making the contributions. He explained that
in California, expenditure of community funds for a community purpose is presumably made
with a donative intent. Id.
120. See D. DoBBs, REmEDis § 4.2, at 299 (1973).
121. 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062, cert. granted, 91 N.J. 191, 450 A.2d 526 (1982).
122. The court emphasized that an advanced degree is the result of an educational process
which begins prior to marriage and concluded that a degree was not property. Refusing also
to classify potential earning capacity as property, the court maintained that there is no sub-

stantive difference in a property award based on a professional degree or potential earning
capacity. The degree is merely a prerequisite of enhanced earning capacity. Id. at 605-10, 442
A.2d at 1066-69. The Mahoney court criticized other jurisdictions' contrary decisions and

opined that courts are willing to extend the property classification only in the assetless situ-
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themselves and do not expect to be repaid for their contributions in any commercial sense.

1 23

The Mahoney court equated the supporting spouse's lost financial expectations with the lost expectations of any spouse who invests part of his life,
energy, and labor in a failed marriage.1M In rejecting the notion that any unjust
enrichment would result, the court stressed that marriage is a joint venture in
1 5
which intimate parties work together, rather than an arm's length association. 2
To achieve legal protection for an investment in the other's degree, the supporting spouse should so provide in a formal contract. Absent such a contract, the
court concluded there is no inequity in denying compensation to the
supporting spouse.

12 6

By insisting on a formal repayment agreement, the Mahoney court ignored
that a married couple rarely contemplates divorce at the time of investment in
a professional degree. Precisely because marriage is not an arm's length association, a formal contract is an impractical prerequisite. Nevertheless, both
parties usually have a genuine understanding that their investment will yield
an economic return. 27 Even if no such understanding existed, the unjust enrichment of the educated spouse could prompt a remedy from the dissolution
court.
When one spouse contributes to the other's education, a court may find that
the student spouse impliedly promised to provide compensation. Circumstantial
evidence can prove this implied promise" 28 and establish an implied in fact
ation. The policy behind these decisions was identified as the desire to ensure that the
supporting spouse does not leave the marriage empty handed. Id. at 607-08, 442 A.2d at 1067.
Restitution was also considered an inappropriate remedy because it fails to recognize the nonfinancial efforts made by the student spouse toward acquisition of the degree. Id. at 611, 442
A.2d at 1069.
123. Id. at 613, 442 A.2d at 1070.
124. Id. at 614, 442 A.2d at 1071. There is, however, an obvious difference in the two
situations. The supporting spouse's contribution to the acquisition of the other's degree is
analogous to an investment with full expectation of financial return. When a spouse invests
his life, energy, and labor in a relationship, he does not generally expect financial remuneration. Id. at 598, 442 A.2d 1062.
125. Id. at 613, 442 A.2d at 1070.
126. Id. at 614, 442 A.2d at 1071. The court specifically approved and quoted from the
opinion in Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 345, 631 P.2d 115, 123 (Ct. App. 1981). Absent
a specific agreement between the spouses, legal arguments of unjust enrichment are untenable. 182 N.J. Super. at 614-15, 442 A.2d at 1071-72. The court, however, pointed out that
if the spouses do not part with roughly equivalent earning capacity, equitable considerations
may invoke application of conventional awards such as alimony. The supporting spouse in
Mahoney had an education comparable to that of the student spouse. The court noted that
where one spouse has sacrificed his own education because of the constraints of marriage, that
spouse would be entitled to rehabilitative alimony for educational purposes. Otherwise, the
supporting spouse would have to look to conventional alimony for compensation. Whether
the alimony award would be forthcoming would depend on the financial situations of both
spouses. Id. at 616, 442 A.2d at 1072. In the companion case to Mahoney, the court awarded
rehabilitative alimony to the supporting spouse. See Hill v. Hill, 182 N.J. Super. 616, 442 A.2d
1072 (1982).
127. Even the Mahoney court noted that the supporting spouse does not sacrifice for the
other's exclusive benefit. 182 N.J. Super. at 613, 442 A.2d at 1071.
128. See, e.g., Usgaard v. Silver Crest Golf Club, 256 Iowa 453, 454, 127 N.W.2d 636, 637
(1964). See also D. DOBBS, supra note 120, § 4.2 at 234.
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contract. Implied in fact contracts represent genuine understandings between
parties shown by their conduct rather than any explicit words. 1 29 If the student
spouse knew or had reason to know that the supporting spouse expected to be
repaid, the supporting spouse would be entitled to a restitutionary award on a
theory of implied in fact contract.130 The marriage circumstance itself may
suggest this understanding, as both spouses usually expect to be paid for their
131
investment by future economic benefit.
Even if a compensation agreement cannot be established, the supporting
spouse may receive the same restitutionary damages based on an implied in law
contract. A quasi-contract represents neither an express nor an inferrable agreement, but is merely a legal fiction invoked to prevent the defendant's unjust
enrichment. 32 In Hubbardv. Hubbard,33 the Oklahoma Supreme Court based
its award to the supporting spouse on the theory of quasi-contract. Mrs.
Hubbard had supported her husband through medical school, internship, and
residence. 134 Most marital resources had been expended for the medical degree,
so the couple had few conventional assets. 33 The Hubbard court ruled that a
degree was not property, but that quasi-contract theory should provide equitable relief in an assetless divorce. 3

Mrs. Hubbard was awarded the value of

129. See, e.g., Dominguez v. Cruz, 95 N.M. 1, 3, 617 P.2d 1322, 1323 (Ct. App. 1980).
130. Cf. Redd v. L. & A. Contracting Co., 246 Miss. 548, 564, 151 So. 2d 205, 209 (1963)
(restitution awarded to sub-contractor who expected to be paid for work done).
131. A spouse would be far less willing to forego acquisition of traditional property
without this expectation. Instead, investment in the student spouse's acquisition of a professional degree would be a comparatively high risk investment which many cautious investors would avoid. A further ramification of the no-remedy decisions is that they may
prevent many would-be students from entering college or the professions. In Florida, for
example, the courts have held that regardless of parents' financial condition, they are not
obligated to provide a college or professional education for their adult children. See White
v. White, 296 So. 2d 619 (Fla. ist D.C.A. 1974). Often, the solution for married students is
that one spouse works, making it possible for the other to attend school. If courts sanction
unjust enrichment of the student spouse, the result will be a decline in the number of
persons willing to assume the supporting role. Many potential students will thus be unable
to attend school. Both these individuals and society as a whole will be deprived of a potential
economic asset.
132. See Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Harris, 360 F.2d 402, 410 (9th Cir. 1966). The elements
of quasi-contract could be established in most cases: (1) the supporting spouse usually is not
making a gift, but instead expects to be paid in terms of future economic benefit; (2) the
student spouse obviously receives a benefit, for in many instances the student spouse would
have been unable to acquire the degree without the supporting spouse's aid; (3) the supporting spouse is not acting officiously or as an intermeddler when he makes the offer of support.
133. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
134. Id. at 749. During the twelve-year marriage, the supporting spouse had contributed
substantially to acquisition of the husband's degree, looking forward to the time when she
would be repaid with financial comfort, prestige, and position. Id. The court noted that without the supporting spouse's direct and indirect contributions to acquisition of the degree, the
student spouse would have had to either prolong his education or incur an enormous debt.
Id. at 751.
135. Id. at 751. The court explained that because of the commitment to the husband's.
education, the family sacrificed their marital resources to acquire the degree. Id.
136. Id. The court adopted the quasi-contract suggestion of the Graham dissent, 194 Colo.
at 435, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting). It characterized the award as a return on the
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her contributions toward support, school and professional training, plus reason13 7
able interest and inflation adjustments.
A restitutionary claim for unjust enrichment may yield a higher restitutionary award than that in Hubbard. By focusing on disgorging the defendant's
windfall rather than compensating the plaintiff,

38

the supporting spouse could

be awarded the value of the benefit conferred."39 This well-established restitutionary measure of damages allows the supporting spouse to receive a share in
the degree's value without encountering the conceptual property classification
problems.140 Such a restitutionary award, however, would entail the valuation
difficulties already discussed. 41
Is

THERE A REMEDY IN FLORIDA?

There are strong indications that the Florida courts would provide a
remedy for the supporting spouse who had substantially contributed to the
other's acquisition of a professional degree. 142 The only Florida appellate
court to address this issue' 4 : specifically refused to classify a professional degree as property.14 4 In that case, however, the wife was compensated by an
alimony award. 14 If the supporting spouse could not qualify for alimony and
supporting spouse's investment in order to prevent unjust enrichment of the student spouse.
603 P.2d at 751-52.
137. 603 P.2d at 751-52. The relief was a cash award made in lieu of property settlement.
The court limited the award to fair compensation for the supporting spouse's past investment. A "vested interest" in the student spouse's future earnings was specifically disapproved.
Id. at 752.
138. See D. DOBBS, supra note 120, § 4.1 at 224.
139. Generally, this award seeks to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant and to
secure for the plaintiff that to which he is justly entitled. See Lauffer v. Vial, 753 Pa. Super.
342, 345, 33 A.2d 777, 779 (1943).
140.
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
141. A restitutionary award could be based in quantum meruit which allows recovery
of the value of the services performed. See In re Voss Estate, 20 Wis. 2d 238, 241, 121 N.W.2d
744, 746 (1963). This award would not be speculative because it is equivalent to the financial
costs incurred in acquiring the education. Comment, supra note 22, at 73. See Comment, supra
note 8, at 592-93.
142. In the military pension area, the Florida courts have compensated the former spouse
for the loss of an expected share in the other's pension without deciding whether a pension
is property. See Mills v. Mills, 417 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982); Cullen v. Cullen, 413
So. 2d 1196 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1982). In both Mills and Cullen, the award granted was in the
form of permanent periodic alimony.
143. Severs v. Severs, __ So. 2d __ (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983).
144. Id. at _. The wife claimed, inter alia, that the lower court had erred in refusing
to grant her a special equity in the "property" of the husband's law degree and license. Id.
Rejecting this contention, the Fifth District Court of Appeal found that "such an award by a
trial court would transmute the bonds of marriage into the bonds of involuntary servitude
contrary to Article VIII of the United States Constitution." Id.
145. The parties had been married for 15 years. The wife worked as a teacher while her
husband attended law school, and then left her career to become a housewife and mother.
Substantial assets were acquired during the marriage, and the trial court awarded both
rehabilitative and lump sum alimony. Id. As a result of that award, the wife's monthly income not including outside earnings was calculated at $1,666, and her husband's monthly
income was assessed at $1,972.59. Id.
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there were no conventional distributable marital assets, it is not certain that
146
a Florida court would decline to adopt a property classification.
If the degree were classified as marital property, then it would be divided
according to equitable distribution methods. 47 In Florida, a judge has the
1 48
power to grant one spouse a "special equity" in the other spouse's property.
The supporting spouse's recovery would not depend upon whether the professional degree was deemed personal or marital property. Thus, the supporting spouse who establishes a contribution to the professional degree's acquisition beyond normal marital duties might be entitled to a special equity in
the degree. The student spouse could defeat the special equity only by proving
that the supporting spouse intended a gift of the degree. There is no presumption of a gift in Florida. 49 If a Florida court finds a professional degree
is the personal property of the student spouse, the special equities doctrine
might provide a remedy to the supporting spouse.150
The property classification has not been successful in other states. There
is some indication the Florida courts will likewise reject it.151 The supporting
spouse could nonetheless be compensated through division of other marital
property. In 1980, the Florida Supreme Court judicially adopted equitable distribution for the state's common law property system.152 Under equitable distribution, the trial judge has the discretion to divide existing marital property
between the parties according to the judge's perception of just and fair apportionment153 In dividing the marital property, the judge could consider and
value the supporting spouse's contribution to the student spouse's degree.

146. Compare Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ct. App. 1979) (classifying a professional license is divisible marital property), rev'd on other grounds, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2131 (Ky. 1982) with Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) (limiting
Inman holding to the assetless divorce).
147. Florida has recently adopted an equitable distribution system. See infra notes 152-55
and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., Duncan v. Duncan, 379 So. 2d 949 (Fla. 1980). A special equity is a vested
interest that a spouse acquires due to contribution of "funds, property, or services made
over and above the performance of normal marital duties." Id. at 952.
149. See Ball v. Ball, 335 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1976). The 1968 Florida Constitution contains a
provision eliminating distinctions between married women and men with regard to their real
or personal property. As a result, the record title to an item of property will be presumed
valid. There will be no presumption of a gift. The spouse claiming a gift has the burden
of proving the intent to make a gift on the part of the contributing spouse. Id. at 7.
150. In Duncan, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the purpose of special equities
is to assist the judge in arriving at equitable property settlements and support orders. The
court added that in determining whether a special equity should be allowed, a judge must
avoid inflexible rules which would restrict the determination of a just and equitable result.
The court emphasized that the critical question is whether the award is equitable considering
the nature of the case. 379 So. 2d 949, 951-52 (Fla. 1980).
151. See supra notes 143-45.
152. See Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). See also W. WEYRAUCH & S.
KxAz, AmiUcAN FAmmy LAw m TRAuNSmON 99 (1983). The Canakaris decision was fore-

shadowed by the opinion of the First District Court of Appeal in Brown v. Brown, 300 So. 2d
719 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974) (cited in Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1203).
153. 382 So. 2d at 1202.
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Other equitable distribution states generally accept this remedy for the support54
ing spouse..
The supporting spouse's right to compensation is already recognized in
Florida's alimony statute which authorizes alimony awards and lists the factors
a divorce judge "shall" consider. 155 One of these factors is a spouse's contributions to the other's education and career building. 56 The statute similarly
57
authorizes lump sum alimony awards. In Canakarisv. Canakaris,1
the Florida
Supreme Court approved a lump sum alimony award to compensate one
spouse's contributions toward the other's increased earning potential. 58
In upholding the trial court's award of both lump sum and periodic support
alimony, 159 the supreme court explained the nature and purpose of lump sum
alimony. Lump sum alimony may be awarded to effect an equitable distribution of marital property. 60 The award must be justified, however, and the
obligor must be able to make the payments without substantially endangering
his economic status. 6 The court recognized that unlike support alimony, a
154. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, _. 574 P.2d 75, 78 (1978).
"A spouse who provides financial support while the other spouse acquires an education is not
without a remedy. Where there is marital property to be divided, such contribution to the
education of the other spouse may be taken into consideration by the court." See also Inman
v. Inman, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2131 (Ky. 1982).
155. FLA. STAT. § 61.08(1) & (2) (1981).
156. Id. § 61.08(2)( 0 .
157. 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 1980). Canakaris officially sanctioned equitable distribution in
Florida and effectively superceded much of the old common law. Although FLA. STAT.
§ 61.08(2)( 0 (1981) specifically requires considering the contribution of one spouse to the
education and career building of the other was in effect when Canakaris was decided, the
Canakaris court apparently overlooked it. Instead, the court inaccurately and incompletely
cited the earlier statute, id. § 61.08 (1978). See ch. 3 Alimony, § 3.10-.12 THE FLA. BAR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., FAMILY LAW SECTION, DISSOLUTION IN THE 80's: AN OVERVIEW, (1980).
158. In Canakaris, the parties had been married for 33 years. The divorce action was
filed by the wife in 1963 on the grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty. The wife requested
maintenance and a division of marital property. The husband's net worth at the time of trial
was $3,749,930. Most of his wealth had been acquired during the marriage and prior to the
1963 separation. His annual income was in excess of $130,000 throughout that period. The
wife's net worth prior to divorce was $292,000. She had an annual income of approximately
$1,000 between 1971 and 1975. 382 So. 2d at 1199. The court indicated that the need of the
payee spouse and the ability to pay of the payor spouse were still necessary prerequisites of a
periodic support alimony award. The following criteria are to be used in establishing need:
the parties' earning ability, their age, health and education, the duration of the marriage,
the standard of living during the marriage, and the value of the parties' estates. Id. at 1201-02.
159. Id. at 1199. The lump sum distribution was a property award consisting of the
husband's interest in the jointly owned residence, valued at $75,000, and $50,000 in cash.
Since their separation, the husband had acquired another residence which was valued at
$430,000. Id.
160. Id. at 1201. See also FLA. STAT. § 61.08 (1979). The court stressed that a judge
should avoid inflexible rules which would hinder equity between the spouses. 382 So. 2d at
1200. See also Mahaffey v. Mahaffey, 401 So. 2d 1372 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1981) (lump sum alimony should be used to equitably distribute marital assets); Neff v. Neff, 386 So. 2d 318 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1980) (lump sum alimony award is determined on basis of fair share of marital
assets).

161. 382 So. 2d at 1201. The court noted that a lump sum award is proper when one
spouse has assisted the other in acquiring property. On the other hand, permanent, periodic
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lump sum award does not depend upon the recipient's financial need.61 2
Two state supreme courts recently held that the divorce courts possess inherent equity powers that permit a remedy for the supporting spouse. 1 63 Florida
dearly recognizes the inherent equity powers of its divorce courts.'1 4 Additionally, the marital philosophy of Florida courts further supports an equitable award when alimony is unavailable and no traditional marital property
exists. The Canakariscourt declared that "basic principles of fairness" require
a dissolution award sufficient to compensate a spouse for marital contributions. 65
Because a Florida court could easily grant an equitable award in the
divorce proceedings, an independent unjust enrichment action may be unnecessary. An unjust enrichment action in implied contract or restitution
might succeed in Florida. A Florida court will likely find inequity in an assetless
situation, for unlike the court in Mahoney, the Florida Supreme Court has long
recognized the contractual nature of marriage.1 66 In Ponder v. Graham, 167 the
Florida Supreme Court held a legislative divorce invalid as violative of the
constitutional prohibition against impairment of vested contractual rights 6s
Further, in Canakaris,the court approved the characterization of the marital
relationship as an equal partnership. 69 The economic partnership and contractual underpinnings of the marital relationship, together with the supreme
court's express concern with reaching a fair and equitable marital settlement,
indicate potential success for an unjust enrichment claim in Florida.

and rehabilitive alimony require proof of the payee's need and the payor's ability to provide the funds. Id.
162. Id. See also Collinsworth v. Collinsworth, 386 So. 2d 570 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1980) (need
of payee spouse is no longer a prerequisite of lump sum alimony award). But see McClanahan
v. McClanahan, 402 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1981) (reversed lump sum alimony award
because need of payee spouse was not established beyond need for periodic support alimony).
163. See DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981); Lundberg v. Lundberg,
107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
164. See Canakaris,382 So. 2d at 1202.
165. Id. at 1204.
166. Compare Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super. at 614, 442 A.2d at 1071 (marriage is not an
arm's length transaction) with Canakaris, 382 So. 2d at 1204 (marriage as equal partnership).
167. 4 Fla. 23 (1851).
168. Id. In Ponder, the wife of a testator was unsatisfied with the provisions of her husband's will. She brought suit for her dower portion. The personal representative defended
the action on the ground that Mary Graham had not received a legitimate divorce from her
first husband, and therefore, she was not married to the decedent. Mary had been granted a
legislative divorce without notice to the first husband while Florida was still a territory of the
United States. Id. at 24-26. The court held the divorce invalid because the legislature was
constitutionally forbidden to pass laws which impair the obligation of contracts. The court
found that the marriage between Mary and her first husband was a contract, and the first
husband's rights therein were vested. Accordingly, the legislature had no power to dissolve
the marriage. Id. at 44-46. See generally W. WVEYRAUCH & S. KATz, supra note 142, at 59-60.
169. 382 So. 2d at 1203-04. See Brown v. Brown, 800 So. 2d 719, 726 (Fla. Ist D.C.A. 1974).
The Canakaris court quoted with approval the First District Court of Appeal opinion in
Brown. 382 So. 2d at 1203-04. The Brown court emphasized the partnership aspects of marriage
and specifically characterized the relationship as an equal partnership. 300 So. 2d at 726.
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CONCLUSION

Whether a professional degree is property depends on a jurisdiction's
definition of that term. Although the trend appears to be towards more expansive property principles, some courts have refused to modify the traditional
inflexible property characterizations.1 70 A court need not classify a professional
degree as property to compensate the supporting spouse.
The underlying focus is on perceptions of equity that depend on a jurisdiction's concept of the marital relationship. Courts that have refused an
award to the supporting spouse have done so because their concepts of marriage were inconsistent with the claimed inequities.1 ' 1 On the other hand, those
courts which grant a remedy recognize that the equities entitle the supporting
spouse to relief.l?2 The inequity of allowing a valuable windfall to one spouse at
the other's expense compelled these courts to extend a remedy.
Because equity considerations form the basis of these decisions, it is not
necessary to expand property principles to include a professional degree.
Awards to the supporting spouse can be based squarely on equity. The preferred method would be a statute, similar to Florida's, specifically authorizing a
lump sum award. The supporting spouse can be compensated by division of
other marital resources. An independent action for unjust enrichment highlights the inequities and may be very valuable in jurisdictions affording no
other relief.
JUDY TAYLOR RusH

170. See, e.g., Ellis v. Ellis, 194 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976) (military retirement pay
not divisible property); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976) (potential
earning capacity not property); Nail v. Nail, 486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) (professional goodwill not property subject to division upon divorce).

171. See generally Wisner v. Wisner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1981) (equityremedy not available because no unjust enrichment involved in a marital relationship);
Mahoney v. Mahoney,

182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062

(Ct. App. Div. 1982)

(marital

relationship is an intimate association which the parties do not generally enter or further
for financial gain).
172. With the possible exception of Horstmann, 263 N.WT.2d 885 (Iowa 1978), all of the
state supreme court decisions awarding a remedy have been primarily concerned with achieving
an equitable result in an assetless divorce. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755
(Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979); Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107

Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982).
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